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REVIEW SECTION COMMENTARY
Michael Grossberg's Telling Tale
How to Tell Law Stories
Michael Grossberg
I have been asked to comment on Brook Thomas's review of A Judg-
ment for Solomon. Beyond the obvious challenge of trying to strike a pose
somewhere between defensiveness and dogmatic reiteration of points made,
it is a rather difficult assignment because Thomas has quite effectively ex-
plained the intent of the book and identified its central issues. And he has
done so with his characteristic insight and verve. Thus not only do I find
myself quite willing to accept his positive assessments, but more important, I
agree with much of what he has to say about the book and the issues it
raises. Nor am I inclined to dwell too much on some of his specific criti-
cisms. Instead, I want to address briefly the two central issues he finds most
problematic in the book: my form of storytelling, and my use of the concept
of legal hegemony.
Thomas is correct is concluding that these two issues were at the heart
of my decision to write about the d'Hauteville case and to write about it in
the way I did. And he is equally correct in assuming that I wanted readers of
the book to leave its pages with thoughts about each subject. Indeed, it is
because both issues are so significant to our understanding of American law
and society-present and past-that I want to respond to Thomas's cri-
tique. In doing so I will inevitably try to clarify the way I approached story-
telling and legal hegemony in the book; however, my larger intent here is to
explain why I think these issues are worth grappling with in the first place.
As Peter Brooks put it, "How stories are told, listened to, received, inter-
preted-how they are made operative, enacted-these are issues by no
means marginal to the law nor exclusive to theory; rather they are part of
law's daily living reality" (1996, 22).
Michael Grossberg is professor of history at Indiana University and editor of the
American Historical Review.
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I will begin with the issue of legal storytelling. As Thomas notes, I
turned to a narrative of the d'Hauteville case because I saw in its remains a
way to inivestigate "the complicated link between social and legal change"
(1998, p. 431). The richness of the material made the case particularly ap-
pealing, especially a cache of introspective letters that formed the initial
means of bargaining between the warring couple. The d'Hauteville case was,
I decided, a great story. My challenge became how to tell it.
I took up that challenge in part because I have come to believe that
such particularized tales return a needed sense of contingency and indeter-
minacy to our understanding of the past and also that narratives return a
sense of the importance of stories to the way we understand events. In mak-
ing this move, of course, I joined a large and growing cadre of historians and
an equally large contingent of sociolegal scholars who champion the impor-
tance of storytelling. Animating this turn to narrative is the belief that
storytelling is an old art form that can and should be reclaimed as a means
of analysis and a form of presentation. The sources of this renewed interest
in storytelling are varied. Prime among them is a sense of disenchantment
with the positivism of many reigning social science methods as well as a
conviction that stories are powerful vehicles with which outsiders can chal-
lenge established authority (Sewell 1992; Brooks 1996; Maza 1996; French
1996).
Among the many debates generated by the return to storytelling has
been one about authorial intent and authorial voice. This specific debate
has been strongly influenced by postmodernism generally and by recent un-
derstandings of textual creation and interpretation developed by literary
critics more particularly. While I do not want to rehearse all the various
arguments here, I do want to emphasize that one of the major results of this
debate has been a much greater consciousness about the authorial role in all
narratives. It is a consciousness shared by both writers and readers, and one
that Thomas and I clearly share as well. And thus Thomas is quite correct
in concluding that I crafted my story of the d'Hauteville case in a very
deliberate fashion as I made a number of choices about how to present the
tale.
Where I think Thomas and I diverge is on the place of overt authorial
interventions in the stories historians tell. He casts the choice primarily as
one of showing versus telling, and in my case quite rightly links it to a
declared goal of having readers experience the d'Hauteville case. As he sug-
gests, legal experience is a keyword of my narrative of the case. Equally
important, he is quite right in concluding that for me as a historian, the
choice of authorial voice was inextricably linked with the fundamental im-
portance of context. However, I differ from Thomas on the question of the
narrative styles open to historians and the possible analytical roles of read-
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ers, especially in his juxtaposition of traditional and experimental historical
methods.
All of us, I assume, want to be considered innovative, and thus to be
labeled traditional is inevitably a bit deflating. Beyond the issue of ego,
however, is the larger question of whether overt interpretative interventions
by historians in their narratives ought to be considered simply a replay of
our craft's conventional methods or a part of new approaches to the writing
of historical narratives. Thomas seems to think the answer is clear. His pres-
entation suggests a set of methodological polar opposites: the more overt the
interpretation, the more conventional the style, and thus, the more the
story is what he considers a recovery project; conversely, the more primary
texts are presented in a seemingly unmediated form, the more experimental
the style and thus the greater latitude for readers to become interpreters and
for the story to be recounted, not recovered. I am not sure, however, that
the range of approaches historians and sociolegal scholars are taking to the
question of authorial intervention is comfortably situated on a continuum
from traditional to experimental.
Much of the intellectual richness of the present moment in academic
writing is a consequence of the variety of narrative styles being developed
by scholars in a number of fields. Among historian storytellers, the range is
indeed quite broad. Approaches to historical narratives include the frequent
authoritative interventions of Natalie Zemon Davis in The Return of Martin
Guerre (1973), the seemingly authorless presentation of multiple and con-
tradictory texts in James Goodman's Stories of Scottsboro (1994), the overtly
autobiographical narrative style in the stories Patricia J. Williams published
as The Alchemy of Race and Rights (1991), the injection of invented dialogue
into John Demos's story of The Unredeemed Captive (1994), and many
others.' Yet these approaches are all pursued in an effort to have readers
experience the tale in some fashion.
In other words, at present there is not so much a singularly preferable
or effective approach to the authorial role in telling history stories as a
range of options. Each narrative choice has attributes and liabilities, but
each is informed as well by the intellectual currents of an age that make
them quite different from previous forms of historical storytelling. In fact, as
I note in the preface to A Judgment for Solomon, part of the reason I wrote
the book in the way I did was a sense of dissatisfaction with the way most
trial tales have been written. So many of these seem to me to take a "Drag-
net" approach to trials ("Just the facts, Ma'am; nothing but the facts"), with
little conveyed sense of the subjectivity of facts or the implications of au-
thorial choice. And thus one result of postmodernism and the linguistic
turn is the insight that questions of authorial intervention in storytelling
must be examined by all would-be storytellers, much like the advent of
1. For a particularly compelling recent example see Cohen 1997.
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Freudian psychology compelled all biographers to think about the inner life
of their subjects. In both cases, however, the results need not be, and have
not been, uniform styles and methods. In other words, it is critical to realize
that, as Robert Weisberg explains, "modem theorists of narrative often ar-
gue that every historical rendering of events is an aesthetic project, as well
as an empirical one, and that every aesthetic strategy has ethical premises
and effects" (Weisberg 1996, 63).
My own narrative approach falls closest to that of historians like Davis
and Carlo Ginzburg (1980), especially their efforts to use their stories to
convey what I would call "the othemess of the past." By that I mean an
authorial intention to make clear to readers the seemingly obvious but I
think quite hard to grasp point that the past was different from the present.
This task is particularly difficult in the United States because it is such a
presentist society. The task is pursued in authorial choices about the presen-
tation of a story's characters and events, the selection of which and how
many words from the past to use, and the determination of the nature and
scope of explicit authorial interventions in a narrative. Making the "other-
ness of the past" clear was a particularly important objective in my story of
the d'Hauteville case because it could easily be read in very presentist
terms-Kramer versus Kramer in period dress. And thus in draft after draft as
I struggled to balance various forms of my own analysis with a presentation
of words from the case, I found myself compelled to make more and more
interventions.
Looking back on those decisions, I would categorize the way that I
directly intervened in my story of the d'Hauteville case in two ways. First, I
penned explicitly contextual interventions. For example, I thought it im-
portant for readers to understand the significant time-bound features of the
case. These included the way the characters in the story conformed to the
letter-writing conventions of their time, the status of mental cruelty as an
illegitimate ground for divorce in the era but one generating debate and
support, and the emergence of the penny press-cheap daily newspapers-
as an innovation of the 1830s with direct implications for popular under-
standing of the law. These were all part of the "otherness" of the past that I
thought had to be explained for readers to experience the case. Second, I
also intervened at various points in the story and particularly at its end to
present my own argument about the meaning and importance of trials in
American culture. As I think Thomas's synopsis makes clear, I had dual
though interconnected goals in writing my story of the case: to have readers
experience the case itself, and to have them evaluate my argument about
the meaning of such experiences. In the preface, organization of the chap-
ters, and conclusion, I tried to engage readers in these linked but separate
conversations. Thus, I tried to speak directly to readers in a way that I do
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not think would have been possible in a less mediated presentation of less
contextualized material like Goodman chose for his Scottsboro narrative.
As a result of these choices I am a little perplexed when Thomas says,
for example, "rather than simply describe Ellen's and Gonzalve's marital dif-
ficulties, [Grossberg] explains their significance by framing them in terms of
conflicting theories of marriage" (1998, 447). I am perplexed in part be-
cause one of the chief lessons I learned from Allan Megill (1989) is that
there is no such thing as simply describing an action in the past; description
is always analysis, and has to be understood as such by authors and readers.
At the same time, it seemed to me that readers could neither understand
nor experience the d'Hautevilles' clashing marital beliefs without some level
of contextualization. That conviction itself is clearly derived from my sense
of the otherness of the past and the concerns I have about just how accessi-
ble its words are to those in the present. In taking such an approach to past
texts I consider myself a beneficiary of intellectual historians such as J. G.
A. Pocock and Quentin Skinner, whose struggles to understand the mean-
ing of early modem European political language led them to turn the noun
"context" into the verb "contexualize."2 Failing to contextualize the
d'Hautevilles' words, I feared, would mean that readers would give them
present-day meanings. I say all this understanding that, as Thomas puts it,
"a 'context' is itself constituted by events that require interpretation and
reconstruction. In other words, to provide a context for events is as much an
act of 'recounting' as narrating the events themselves" (1998, 447-448). If
we eschew the possibility of a completely objective presentation of the
past-even by simply recording its words in the present-then providing a
context for past events is one of the fundamental tasks of a historian writing
a narrative or any other kind of an analysis. Contextualization can be done
well; it can be done poorly. But I do not think it is a task that ought to be
spurned in an effort to encourage readers to experience past events. How-
ever, I should acknowledge a critical assumption embedded in such asser-
tions: Ultimately, the past can never be completely accessible to those in
the present, and thus its events can never be fully experienced.
Perhaps I tipped the balance between intervention and recording past
words too far toward the former, but the decision to strike the balance that I
did stemmed from my dual objectives. I wanted readers to engage with the
case itself as much as possible on its own terms and with my analysis of the
meaning of such cases for our understanding of the changing place of law in
American society. I tried to separate the two objectives. I tried, in particu-
lar, to present as full an account of the clashing ideas and interests in the
case as I could-albeit in a contextualized fashion. I wanted readers to form
their own conclusions about the fate of the disputed child and the other
issues of the case without being guided to favor one spouse -or the other.
2. For the seminal studies using this method see Pocock 1975; Skinner 1979.
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Thus I not only withheld the decision of the case, I also made the exposi-
tory decision to place many words from the couple and their families, law-
yers, judges, newspaper writers, and others directly in the text and secured
the right from my publisher to have all their words-statements short and
lengthy-set full width rather than indented. I did so because I have always
thought that readers' eyes fly over indented text, and that the format itself
inevitably subordinates the actor's words to an author's analysis. I tried to
avoid these problems and thus in my contextualized manner give readers a
basis for experiencing the case through its words and thus for making their
own judgments about both the case itself and my analysis of such cases.
Whether I succeeded in these objectives or not, my intentions and
Thomas's. critique underscore the importance of authorial intervention as an
issue in the writing and reading of historical stories. And they bring to the
fore questions about whether a more or less authorially mediated story is the
more effective means of enhancing readers' encounters with the past. In
other words, I hope these comments make clear that I think Thomas has
raised some critical questions about the relationship between methodologi-
cal choices, the nature of the historian's craft, and her or his engagement
with readers. I think these questions are important because I am even more
convinced than when I wrote A Judgment for Solomon that storytelling is an
important method of writing legal history, though I also believe it can be
undertaken in a variety of ways.
Thomas's essay also highlights a second analytical issue I struggled with
in telling the story of the d'Hauteville case. He raises questions about how
stories can be used to analyze the power and authority of the law in a society
like that of the United States. Thomas quite rightly notes that I was at-
tracted to the case in part because it provided me with a compelling means
of addressing that issue. I also thought' the case offered material for analyz-
ing how the place and power of American law have changed over time, the
issue ceritral to historical analysis. Indeed, it may be that the primacy I give
as a historian to questions about change over time has produced some of our
differences about narratives. In any event, as Thomas explains, my attempt
to address questions of legal power in a story of the d'Hauteville case led me
to Alexis de Tocqueville and his metaphor of the shadow of the law. It did
so in part because I sought ways to generalize about the story. As Paul
Gewirtz has pointed out, stories tend to be particularized, theories to be
more general. Consequently, to "move from story to action, we need theo-
ries too, theories that help us to assess the representativeness of a particular
story, to choose among competing stories, to decide which facts are rele-
vant. So, too, we need to appreciate the value of general rules as well as
particular stories, for general rules, in spite of their imperfections, can pro-
tect against favoritism and unequal treatment" (Gewirtz, 6-7).
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Perhaps Thomas is right that I became captured by the shadow of the
law metaphor and thus victimized by its unintended images. I do know that
I was captured by the d'Hauteville story itself. I was drawn to the case be-
cause the d'Hautevilles' letters and other archival materials provided a
unique set of sources chronicling how laypeople encountered the law and
reacted to what I termed the legalization of their dispute. As I read and re-
read Ellen and Gonzalve's letters, their lawyers' letters and briefs, and then
the widening commentaries on the couple and their case, I certainly got a
sense that they all felt the presence of the law.
In an effort to understand and then convey the pair's "lived experi-
ence" of law, I recalled a dramatic exchange between the couple as their
efforts at negotiating a settlement crumbled. Gonzalve wrote to Ellen in-
voking his legal rights to their son Frederick and warning, "Neither days,
nor weeks, nor months, nor constant efforts would succeed in changing my
determination with regard to it." Ellen responded to his threats to haul her
into court and to pursue her relentlessly by declaring, "Remember, you are
accountable to your final Judge for the suffering you occasion. Arbitrary and
artificial rights will not weigh in the balance against humanity and mercy,
before Him" (Grossberg 1996, 48, 49). These words were important to me
because they indicated the pair's growing consciousness of the law,
Gonzalve's conscious use of legal rules as bargaining chips in their spousal
conflict, and Ellen's ultimately unsuccessful invocation of a competing re-
gime of authority, religion, to counter Gonzalve's legal claims. As the case
developed, its growing pile of public and private documents clearly revealed
that the couple felt a growing presence of the law in their lives. By its end,
both d'Hautevilles understood that the discretionary authority of courts
under American custody law and its "best interest of the child" rule meant
that they and their families were in the law's thrall until the child became
an adult. Every action they took sprang from their consciousness of the law's
hold on them. Thus I concluded that I had to find a way to convey the
central reality of their legal experience: an increasing consciousness of the
law, an appreciation of its power over them, and a sense of the tactical
options it afforded them to contest specific rules and decisions as well as the
constitutive consequences of their choices. And that conclusion led me to
generalize about their legal experiences by adopting Tocqueville's metaphor
and crafting an argument about the growing hegemony of the law. Thomas
questions both decisions and in doing so raises some compelling issues about
the use of narrative to probe the relationship between legal events and
structures.
I should note that my use of the shadow-of-the-law metaphor was not
premised on an assumption that individuals preexisted the law. On the con-
trary, I quite agree with Thomas on that score, and perhaps I should have
made it clearer that, to use his phrase, "people are always already born
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within the shadow of the law" (1998, 455). However, my concern was with
trying to understand and write about changing individual legal conscious-
ness. I think that finding ways to examine legal consciousness, and how it
has changed over time individually and collectively, is both a critical issue
in legal history and a primary reason for writing legal narratives. It is also a
very difficult task for historians because there are so few sources that can be
used to examine legal consciousness in the past.
Thus one reason for writing A Judgment for Solomon was to take advan-
tage of the revealingly introspective materials in the case to examine the
issue of legal consciousness. In doing that, I did not mean to imply that the
d'Hautevilles operated outside of a legal regime until their marital woes
erupted, but rather to demonstrate that neither one of them was very much
aware of such a regime. Conflict forced Ellen, Gonzalve, their parents, and
then an escalating cast of characters to think about and try to understand
the rules of marriage, divorce, child custody, and habeas corpus for the first
time. I relied on the notions of "drift" and "trouble cases" developed initially
by Karl Llewellyn and E. Adamson Hoebel in their classic The Cheyenne
Way to analyze legal continuity and change. I used them to argue that it is
in cases of trouble that laypeople's individual legal consciousness is most
visible, and that such cases produce the kind of sources I found in the debris
of the d'Hauteville case.
The shadow metaphor seemed to be a phrase from the era itself that
conveyed the consciousness of the law that individuals like Ellen and
Gonzalve experienced. It also conveyed the reality that the law included
not merely a matrix of formal institutions, rules, and actors, but also a set of
cultural beliefs and practices that influenced individuals as their conflicts
became consciously "legal." For this couple, as for so many others, private
conflicts led to a first encounter with law and thus the first need to think
about it consciously. Perhaps "trapped in the shadow of the law" is not the
most effective phrasing to achieve these ends; however, the phrase does
present the visual image I sought: individuals forced to deal with the power
of legal rules, legal beliefs, legal customs, and legal institutions in a way that
demonstrated both their agency and the limits that the law imposed on
their choices. And thus the metaphor is not meant to assert that individuals
like this warring couple are simply trapped and powerless, but rather to sug-
gest the relative power of the legal order and litigants once a conflict has
become a legal one. Still, Thomas's critique has made me understand that
the metaphor may not be as useful in suggesting the impact of laypeople on
the law.
As the foregoing explanation suggests, I found the shadow metaphor
compelling in part because it provided a means of analyzing the power of
law beyond its formal institutions and thus a way to engage with the Gram-
scian concept of hegemony. Like many historians of American law, I was
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drawn to a case in the antebellum era because the years from the Revolution
to the Civil War seem to be the time when the American legal system
established a degree of power and authority worth considering in Gram-
scian-influenced terms. 3 And thus I do not think that my argument about
the growing hegemony of the law over dispute resolution does quite as much
injustice to either the historical record or to the concept of hegemony as
Thomas suggests.
Instead, my approach to the issue of hegemony differs from that of
Thomas, particularly regarding how it has been modified and adapted since
Gramsci's initial formulation. I would not go so far as to endorse the asser-
tion of historian T. J. Jackson Lears (1985) that hegemony has become such
a neutered term that it is the Marxism that can be taken home to mother.
However, I do think it is an intellectual construct whose meaning has been
contested and changed in the years since Antonio Gramsci wrote his prison
notebooks.4 And I think hegemony tends to dehistoricize unless it is contin-
ually reapplied, contested, and modified. For example, recent restatements
of Gramsci's theories have called into question interpretations that equated
hegemony with ideological consensus. And scholars such as Florencia E.
Mallon have advocated a fluid concept of hegemony that avoids dichoto-
mizing "the dominant" and "the popular" (1994, 70). Such approaches tend
to present hegemony as a time-bound cultural process. According to Wil-
liam Roseberry, what "hegemony constructs, then, is not a shared ideology
but a common and meaningful framework for living through, talking about,
and acting upon social orders characterized by domination" (1994, 362). 1
tried to use the term in this fashion. And thus, for instance, my assertion
that hegemony is particularly useful in complicating our understanding of
rule in antebellum America does not inevitably lead to a search for a single
dominant class in the narrow sense that Thomas seems to suggest (1998,
452).
I applied the concept of legal hegemony to the antebellum United
States because I think it helps us understand the growing foundational sta-
tus of American law in the new republic, a power that helped frame market
and social relations in critical ways. Hegemony illuminates the law's power
to frame critical aspects of daily life from work to matrimony to criminality
to business organization, and it helps us to realize that this framing power
had real consequences for everyone, even as it increased the authority for
lawyers and judges. Thus it does seem to me that the notion of the law's
hegemony offers insights into the relative power of social groups, as I think
Ellen and Gonzalve as laypeople discovered. Indeed, the concept of legal
3. For the most important recent statement of this argument see Tomlins 1993. And for
a compelling discussion of the consistent failure of alternatives to the law see Auerbach 1983.
4. A particularly notable and influential example is Eugene D. Genovese's use of the
hegemony (1974, 25-49).
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hegemony, particularly with the insightful distinction between it and ideol-
ogy developed by Jean Comaroff and John Comaroff, helps us understand
the utility and significance of portraying the law as a distinct and dominant
arena for "competing ideologies" (1998, 452) such as maternalism and pa-
ternalism. Similarly, legal hegemony helps us understand Gramsci's still very
salient point that power does not emanate simply from political institutions.
In the United States, part of the law's power came from the conviction that
it was not so clearly a part of the traditional political structures but a dis-
tinct set of social and cultural practices. Thus a set of framing beliefs about
the autonomy of law encouraged a rule-of-law ideology embedded in the
republic during the antebellum years. Those beliefs were premised on a sep-
aration of law and politics and encouraged growing assertions of law as the
nation's civil religion and the growing appeal of rights and rights talk. In
turn, these convictions postulate an extension of law beyond the concrete
organs of the state as does Tocqueville's metaphor of the shadow of the law.
Thus to me, cases like the d'Hautevilles' demonstrate in multiple ways that
the power of the American legal order had real consequences for lay and
professional groups. Though I agree that crude capture models depicting the
law as simply the tool of a singular dominant class greatly oversimplify legal
authority, I also think that the time-bound use of the concept of legal he-
gemony prevents us from elevating the power of individual agency so high
that it turns the legal system into some sort of neutral arena for interest-
group conflicts.
Finally, I also want to address the important questions Thomas raises
about the implications of combining the shadow of the law metaphor with
legal hegemony through statements like law tightening "its stranglehold on
American dispute resolution." Such depictions, he insists, are oversimplifi-
cations and convey "a very negative image" (1998, 453). However, I am less
concerned with whether it is a negative image than with how effectively
such phrases portray legal experiences like those I chronicled in A Judgment
for Solomon. Phrases like that one certainly express my conclusions about
the direction of legal change, and I think it proceeds logically from the
d'Hauteville case.
While I of course agree with Thomas that a doctrine like coverture
influenced individuals before the custody changes I discuss in the book, my
argument is that changes in the place and influence of the law must be
charted as well. Thus, documenting the existence of a body of legal rules at
any particular point in time is less significant than an attempt to historicize
the power of legalism as an ordering force in society. In that vein, the
d'Hauteville case reveals the increasing legalization of troubled marriages in
antebellum America. It also suggests some of the sources and consequences
of the steady growth of the American divorce rate from the 1830s to the
present and the accompanying rise in child custody determinations that it
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has spawned. These developments are, to my mind, but one example of why
the law has assumed a greater presence in the lives of increasing numbers of
American men and women and thus why they have entered the law's
shadows. Indeed, it is worth noting that when family law scholars Robert
Mnoonkin and Robert Kornhauser (1979) wanted to paint a word picture of
the dynamics of divorce negotiations, they too seized on the Tocquevillian
metaphor to talk about "bargaining in the shadow of the law." It is this
dynamic reality rather than a static sense of law as a constant set of institu-
tions that I tried to capture with the shadow metaphor and the use of legal
hegemony.
And thus my use of the terms was not intended to champion a return
to a pre-nineteenth-century era in the history of Anglo-American cover-
ture, but rather to suggest that the growing consciousness of family law rules
among Americans has had very real consequences. I also used these terms to
raise questions about the wisdom of relying on an adversarial legal system
and its showcase trials to resolve family problems like child custody. Perhaps
such assertions are negative, but I think they are logical conclusions of the
story I told. Indeed, they are one of its morals.
I want to conclude by noting that despite my disagreement with some
facets of Thomas's critique, I take some solace from that the fact he has
addressed precisely the issues that I wanted to raise in writing A Judgment for
Solomon. And I appreciate the seriousness with which he engaged me on
those issues. My comments here are intended to continue 'that dialogue.
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